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In this paper we examine how the interaction between influences of commercial banking and 
poverty alleviation shaped the evolution of modern microfinance. Using institutional theory as a 
lens, we observe that the commercial banking logic increasingly displaced the microfinance field’s 
foundational poverty alleviation and development principles over time. We argue that this process 
of displacement can occur inadvertently as organizations that embody multiple logics draw 
disproportionately on only one of those logics when developing legitimating accounts of their 
activity to stakeholders. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of permeability – the extent to 
which the elements of a logic are ambiguous and loosely coupled – to explain why some logics 
may be more or less open to the influence of other logics. We conclude by discussing implications 





Microfinance today is a major industry with thousands of organizations serving around 155 million 
clients worldwide (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). In its modern form, the field was conceived by 
poverty alleviation practitioners as a tool to provide sustainable financial services to populations 
typically excluded by mainstream banking institutions (Ditcher 1999; Yunus, 2007). Besides the 
impressive growth of microfinance, recent observations suggest that the poverty alleviation 
practitioners are grappling with the rise - both structurally and ideologically - of increased 
commercial banking in the field (Evans, 2010; Khavul, 2010; Hermes, Lensink & Meesters, 2011; 
Hoque, Chishty & Halloway, 2011). The purpose of this paper is to explore this paradox: how is it 
that poverty alleviation practitioners find themselves being displaced by the very same commercial 
principles which had caused mainstream financial institutions to avoid poverty lending in the first 
place? We believe insight into this turn of events is important not only for understanding the state 
of microfinance today, but also the long-term trajectories of other industries which exist at the 
intersection of multiple institutions. 
Our research suggests microfinance underwent three important shifts in its underlying principles. 
First, modern microfinance was established when poverty alleviation practitioners re-imagined 
financial principles as a mechanism for sustainable poverty alleviation. In doing so, they 
reinvigorated hope and attracted global attention to development work. Second, the merger of 
poverty alleviation with financial principles enabled microfinance organizations to track their 
success for donors, government, and media through either financial or development metrics. Here 
we find practitioners' preference for financial metrics and the subsequent refinement of practices 
enabling organizations to perform well on these metrics. Third, when observers brought challenges 
to the efficacy of microfinance, practitioners were unable to adequately harness evidence 




still justify their success to observers through their financial performance. We claim this shift to 
financial principles accompanied the loss of status among poverty alleviation practitioners, limited 
the latter's ability to define legitimate patterns of behavior in the microfinance field, and created a 
space for commercial bankers to establish influence. 
In order to understand the rise and fall of various principles, patterns of behavior, and the groups 
committed to them in an organizational sector, we turn to the literature on institutional logics 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). The theoretical ideas we advance in this 
paper follow from our comparisons of this literature, especially on field-level complexity 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodieh, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011), to patterns we see emerging in the 
field of microfinance. The material on microfinance we present in this paper comes from a review 
of empirical research; archival data such as news reports and editorials, public statements by 
microfinance actors, and industry guidelines; as well as discussions with academic and practitioner 
experts. 
Beyond the context of microfinance, our study contributes to theory on field dynamics and 
institutional logics. First, we draw attention to and provide a mechanism through which 
institutional fields are shaped by unintended consequences rather than directed social action.  
Second, we introduce the notion of permeability to denote that some institutional logics may be 
more susceptible to the influence of other logics by nature of their nomological structure (Suddaby, 
2010), and that organizational fields constituted of logics with asymmetric levels of permeability 
may be prone to instability. For practice, our review of the evolution of microfinance points to the 
need for entrepreneurial efforts to attend to the origins of legitimacy of these ventures (Hargadon 




techniques, metrics, and values that are borrowed from other fields to serve as a vocabulary of 
legitimation can ultimately lead to the displacement of entrepreneurs’ original goals.  
In the sections below we begin by providing an account of the microfinance context. We then 
develop and use our theoretical lens to gain insight on the evolution of microfinance, in the process 
advancing theoretical understanding of field dynamics and institutional logics. Finally, we discuss 
practical implications for poverty alleviation and conclude with suggestions for future research.  
 
CONTEXT: POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND THE RISE OF MICROFINANCE 
Prior to the establishment of modern microfinance, the field of global poverty alleviation 
was dominated by two movements born in the 1970’s out of the perceived failures of post-war 
development assistance in reducing absolute poverty and disparities of income (Dichter, 1999). 
The two trends, basic human needs (BHN) and integrated rural development (IRD) were based on 
a view that portrayed poverty as a multifaceted phenomenon where factors such as the level of 
infrastructure development, availability of education, and community health were interrelated and 
integral in promoting or hindering economic development (Dichter, 1999). 
These movements also put, for the first time, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) at 
the forefront of poverty alleviation activities. State agencies and inter-governmental organizations 
such as the World Bank which had previously been at the helm of these efforts were facing their 
own legitimacy crises such as allegations of corruption or pandering to special interests. It was 
hoped that NGOs, managed by poverty alleviation practitioners having unique knowledge from 
their locally embedded ties in developing countries would revitalize the field. By the 1980’s 




up to their promise. Observers noted that the comprehensive aid programs followed by NGOs were 
often beyond their means, and through mission drift they had become ineffective in making deep 
changes (Dichter, 1999). 
The revitalization of hope for many in the poverty alleviation field came through the 
emergence of modern microfinance most famously led by economist and founder of the Grameen 
Bank, Mohammed Yunus, who combined the ideas of entrepreneurship, financial theory, and 
poverty alleviation (Khawari, 2004; Khavul, 2010). In 1983 the Grameen Bank was formally 
established.   
Broadly speaking, the goal of microfinance was to provide cheap credit to people living in 
poverty, who were traditionally excluded by mainstream banks and had recourse only to loan 
sharks (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). Poverty alleviation practitioners hoped that borrowers 
would use the small loans to establish enterprises that would enable them break cycles of poverty 
(Yunus, 2007). In the early stages of microfinance, group-lending was the dominant model. Under 
this model, the microfinance organization would not lend to individual clients, but would lend to 
small, self-selecting groups. Under such a system, the failure of one client to repay the loan would 
result in denial to credit for all group members (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). Through group 
lending, microfinance organizations could save not only on transactions costs in a number of ways, 
but also substitute social capital in the place of traditional collateral that borrowers lacked 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). 
Initial recorded successes in Bangladesh (Yunus, 2007) led to the spread, and eventual 
mainstreaming of microfinance, leading the UN to declare 2005 the International Year of 
Microcredit. By 2007, the Microcredit Summit Campaign reported that 3,350 microfinance 
institutions served 154.8 million clients worldwide (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). With growth, 




and ACCION, rating agencies such as MIX Market, “best practices”, and regular meetings of 
practitioners (Epstein & Yuthas, 2010).  
Two widely held goals in the field of microfinance which work to reinforce each other are 
sustainability and outreach (Dichter, 1999; Morduch, 1999; Khawari, 2004; Epstein & Yuthas, 
2010; Hishigsuren, 2006). Outreach is the goal of extending as much access as possible to 
microfinance measured by the number of clients served thereby supporting the vision of an 
inclusive banking system. Sustainability is the goal of maintaining enough revenues to cover 
operating expenses over time, a necessary condition if microfinance is to impact poverty in the 
long run (Khawari, 2004; Rosengard, 2004).  
Since the period of explosive growth in the microfinance field, methods of poverty lending 
have become so highly sophisticated and refined that repayment rates among microfinance 
institutions exceed those of what most commercial banks maintain (Dichter, 1999). Despite these 
successes, few mechanisms – other than a handful of colorful stories of successful clients (Epstein 
& Smith, 2007; London, 2009) – have emerged to provide evidence that microfinance is actually 
benefitting the lives of the poor (CGAP, 2006; El-Zoghbi & Martinez, 2011). Criticisms are 
mounting from a number of corners that microfinance as a vehicle for poverty alleviation has failed 
to deliver on a number of fronts (Karnani, 2007; Bateman, 2011; El-Zoghbi & Martinez, 2011; 
Economist, 2009). These include concerns about its sustainability, lack of social and economic 
development, and the impact of aggressive lending practices in fostering escalating cycles of debt 
amongst borrowers (Simanowitz, 2011; Roodman, 2012). 
The response from practitioners of microfinance in providing counter-evidence on the 
social and economic benefits of their activities has been relatively sparse. Instead, most 
microfinance organizations continue to rely on internal financial performance metrics in justifying 




pillars of outreach and sustainability, with no social indicators as a counterweight, have caused 
tension with development goals. Practitioners and industry observers suggest that the rush to 
growth has led microfinance organizations to increasingly seek clients who are easiest to assess, 
such as those in urban instead of rural areas (Rogaly, 1996; Simanowitz, 2011); those involved in 
businesses with rapid turnover, such as retail instead of farming (Dichter, 1999; Hermes, Lensink, 
& Meesters, 2011); and the ‘better-off’ of the poor (Chowdhury, 2009; Epstein & Yuthas, 2010), 
in a process called ‘upscaling’ that leads to microfinance institutions leaving behind their social 
mission to compete for the clients of traditional commercial banks (Armendariz  & Murduch, 
2010). Elizabeth Rhyne, Managing Director of the Center for Financial Inclusion, and a critic of 
aggressive growth strategies (Rhyne, 2010), claims that outreach (“scale”) has become a “hypnotic 
mantra” taken by practitioners as inherently good for the world’s poor without serious 
considerations of its downsides (Simanowitz, 2011: 4). In some cases this has led to conflicts 
between microfinance organizations competing for clients. For example, employees of Grameen 
Bank and BRAC were criticized for offering loans on the spot to women in villages already served 
by smaller NGOs (Rogaly, 1996: 107). These practices were attributed to staff compensation 
policies and expansion goals by the organizations (Ebdon, 1995; Rogaly, 1996) 
Further challenging the delicate balance of development and banking, many formerly non-
profit microfinance institutions have explicitly embraced a more commercial orientation. There 
have been several high profile cases of non-profit microfinance institutions transforming 
themselves into regulated commercial banks such as Banco Solidario (Morduch, 1999; Khawari, 
2004), SKS Microfinance, Compartamos, and Caja los Andes (Epstein & Smith, 2007) which have 
then grown tremendously. Caja los Andes, for instance, after being spun off the NGO Procredito 
saw its loan portfolio rise from US $3.2 million to $36.8 million five years later (Rosengard, 2004). 




organizations are in existence alongside regulated banks that have entered the microfinance sector 
from the mainstream. While commercial microfinance organizations are still a minority in the field, 
their control over the market vastly exceeds their non-profit counterparts. In 1995, the World 
Bank’s Sustainable Banking for the Poor survey estimated that while commercial banks constituted 
7.8% of microfinance organizations worldwide, they accounted for 78% of outstanding loans. By 
contrast, 73% of microfinance organizations were classified as NGOs, and were responsible for 
only 4% of the outstanding loans (Dichter, 1999). More recently, a former Indian Minister of State 
for External Affairs and UN Under-secretary General noted that “only 50 of India’s roughly 1,000 
microfinance institutions are private (as opposed to NGOs), but the top four [commercial 
microfinance institutions] account for 80% of the market. Many of them doubled their revenues in 
the 2009-2010 fiscal year...whereas rural co-operatives, which also make small loans, grew by 3%” 
(Tharoor, 2010).  
The proponents of commercialized microfinance have found support from external 
observers from the governments, media, donors, and academia (Ayayi & Sene, 2010; Copestake 
2007). Researchers have suggested that superior outreach, lower interest rates, and more efficient 
governance (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010), in addition to the ability to offer savings accounts 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010) mean that commercial microfinance organizations can do more to 
help the world’s poor in accessing financial services than NGOs, even if it is not their primary goal. 
While this debate has yet to be settled, recent public comments suggest that the influence of 
commercial banking has grown to a level far beyond the comfort of the founders of modern 
microfinance working in the field of poverty alleviation (Lascelles, 2008; Rosenberg, 2008; Yunus, 
2011). This is a surprising turn for the founders of microfinance, who sought to establish the field 
in response to a commercial banking sector which they criticized as excluding the poor. In the next 




migration and shifting boundaries of institutional logics, and their role in the unique development 
of the field of microfinance. 
 
MODERN MICROFINANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 
Institutional Logics, Affordance, and Change 
Research in the field of microfinance by management theorists has been relatively sparse 
(Khavul, 2010) although there are two recent studies which take an institutional theory perspective 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Khavul, Chavez, & Bruton, 2011). In their comparative study of two 
microfinance organizations, Banco Solidario and Caja de Ahorro y Prestamo, Batillana and Dorado 
(2010) illustrate the importance of identity in organizations trying to balance hybrid logics. They 
suggest that microfinance institutions lack a “ready-to-wear” template in structuring their goals in 
activities, and that a strong, shared organizational identity is necessary to prevent competing 
subgroups from breaking apart the organization. On the other hand, Khavul et al. (2011) take a 
historical, macro-level perspective in analyzing the contested boundaries between the microfinance 
and commercial banking sectors in Bolivia in which regulatory battles played a key role in 
determining the players in the field.  
Building on this body of work, we examine microfinance through the lens of institutional 
logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) as we believe the tensions between 
the two defining logics of the field – development and banking – drive much of its unique 
development and many of its interesting characteristics. 
Institutional logics are “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which 
constitutes [an institution’s] organizing principles and which is available to organizations and 




the ‘DNA’ behind institutions; they are normative and cultural-cognitive frameworks that are 
replicated and manifested in stable patterns of social behavior within which they exist and give 
meaning.  A key element of logics is how they define the ‘rules of the game’ (Zhao & Wry, 2011), 
and thereby determine the legitimacy of actions and status of actors within an institutional field; a 
recognizable social field whose actors partake in a “common meaning system and ... interact more 
frequently and more fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, 2008). 
Institutional logics are constituted of complex sets of more-or-less interrelated schemas, 
norms, causal explanations, symbols, and other cognitive elements (van Dijk et al., 2011). Yet, 
treatment of logics has in large part characterized them as monolithic entities. While early research 
into institutional logics portrayed interactions as limited to one dominant logic being contested by, 
and sometimes replaced with, an emerging logic (Greenwood et al., 2011), more recent work by 
contrast describes instances where multiple logics coexist within a field (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Greenwood et al., 2011), settle in temporary truces (van Gestel & Hillebrand, 2011) or even 
complement one another (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Secci, 2011). Furthermore, research shows that 
certain environments may grant actors ‘affordances’ to reshape their institutional contexts 
(Leinhart, Crowley, & Knutson, 2002)  
More recently, van Dijk et al. (2011) in their study of radical innovation at two established 
firms describe logics as being constituted of a number of elements and use the concept of 
affordances to note that there may be opportunities in the interpretation of these elements, allowing 
reflexive actors (Giddens, 1984) to transform a logic by introducing “novel ideas to be incorporated 
into, merged with, or replace established interests, norms, and beliefs”.    Van Dijk et al.’s (2011) 
portrayal of logics involves elements which may be ambiguous and thus have room for 
interpretation, or as having multiplicity, where prescriptions may be sharply defined but 




describe how actors variously ‘edit’ or ‘translate’ logics to fit them to local contexts (see Sahlin 
and Wedlin, 2008 for a review).  
Complementary to these insights is work on institutional entrepreneurship (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Tracey et al. (2011) describe institutional 
entrepreneurship as a multi-level phenomenon that includes political processes and production or 
alteration of meaning systems by actors (individual or collective) seeking to change or create new 
institutions. Parallel processes are described by researchers studying institutional work (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006), as the “purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” that generally show the social action of actors in more 
subtle, rather than ‘heroic’ terms (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011).   
Both of these streams have shown that actors embedded in, or at least having access to, 
multiple logics can draw from them to bring about institutional change in their field. The work in 
this tradition of institutional entrepreneurship includes Boxenbaum and Battilana’s (2005) study of 
the transposition of diversity management practices to Denmark by employees and consultants; 
Rao, Monin, and Durand’s (2003) study of the emergence of nouvelle cuisine in the French culinary 
world; and Tracey et al.’s (2011) study of the creation of new organizational forms. In each of these 
cases, opportunity recognition and creative insights by actors engaged in institutional 
entrepreneurship follow their experiences with multiple logics, which enables them to see beyond 
the taken-for-granted ‘rules’ defining any one field. 
 
The High Cost of Borrowed Logics 
We present our theoretical analysis of the evolution of microfinance in three stages, each 
drawing attention to a particular set of interactions between the logics of development and 




first stage covers the emergence of modern microfinance through the importation of banking logics 
into the field of development, and how this enabled institutional entrepreneurs provide the latter 
with newfound legitimacy. The second stage follows the operations of microfinance organizations 
and the various options available to them in producing legitimating accounts. Here we observe the 
institutionalization of the practice of using financial metrics to infer poverty alleviation and social 
development outcomes. The third stage begins with the wave of internal and external criticism 
directed at microfinance’s efficacy at fulfilling development goals, and the following changes in 
the field. Here we argue that earlier choices by microfinance practitioners resulted in a highly 
sophisticated financial framework which withstood the criticism, and gave room for commercial 
bankers to shift the field’s underlying principle towards their commercial logic. A model of this 
process is outlined in figure 1 below. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                                  ------------------------------- 
 
Stage 1: Hybridization of logics and the creation of microfinance provides poverty 
alleviation with newfound legitimacy 
We contend that if institutional logics are ‘open’ to transformation by virtue of their 
ambiguities and contradictions, then the presence of a shared, strongly-articulated alternative logic 
would provide actors with a set of material (norms, cognitive frameworks, practices, and so on) by 
which to resolve them. While van Dijk et al. (2011) describe actors manipulating elements within 
an institutional logic, it follows from research dealing with the multiplicity of logics that actors can 
also interpret ambiguities, resolve contradictions, or otherwise ‘fill in the gaps’ apparent in one 
logic by drawing on other logics available to them, rather than drawing on this material out of thin 




Within the context of microfinance, Mohammad Yunus, an American-trained economist 
held a professorship at Chittagong University in his native Bangladesh. Yunus describes how his 
particular position as an economist working in a university surrounded by poverty-stricken villages 
allowed him to see a contradiction between two logics at a time of famine in his country: 
I used to feel a thrill at teaching my students the elegant economic theories that 
could supposedly cure societal problems of all types. But in 1974, I started to dread 
my own lectures. What good were all my complex theories when people were 
dying of starvation on the sidewalks and porches across from my lecture hall?” 
(Yunus, 2007, p. viii). 
 
Motivated to alleviate the desperate poverty he saw, Yunus made repeated trips with his 
students to develop practical solutions grounded in the context of nearby villages. Yet, instead of 
being completely detached from his economic training, Yunus drew from the basic assumptions of 
economic theory in interpreting the causes of poverty. In his account of interviewing a stool-maker 
in Jobra village (Yunus, 2007, p. 46), Yunus’s attention and reasoning is clearly revealing of his 
educational background: his mind is focused on issues of interest rates and access to raw materials, 
framing the villager’s poverty as an input-output micro-level process, and claiming that the poor 
were ‘natural entrepreneurs’ (see Thornton & Ocasio, 2008 for how logics mediate attention).  
In their model of institutional entrepreneurship, Tracey et al. (2011) describe problem 
framing as the first step in opportunity recognition. Yunus defined the problem as the poor being 
unable to access cheap credit (Yunus, 2007) and proposed that through banking services and market 
mechanisms (Khavul, 2010) the poor would be able to reap the benefits of their work and improve 
their living conditions (Morduch, 1999; Yunus, 2007). 
Such tactics legitimate the focal actor to the extent that other actors in the local field are 




legitimate and 2) the external logic is considered applicable to the local field (Friedland & Alford, 
1991). In the context of microfinance, we find that the foundational work by Yunus and the 
Grameen Bank was aimed at solving a crisis in the poverty alleviation field concerning the means 
of traditional development methods by importing the logics of economic theory-based banking.  
By the 1980’s IRD and BHN had lost much of their legitimacy both among poverty 
alleviation practitioners and broader society (Dichter, 1999). While the espoused goal of a poverty-
free world may not have been questioned, traditional methods used in working towards that goal 
had failed to demonstrate their efficacy and thus left room for a new approach. The foundation of 
modern microfinance, through the work of Yunus and the Grameen Bank, marks the beginning of 
dual logics in this field: banking and development (Rogaly, 1996; Batillana & Dorado, 2010; 
Khavul et al., 2011). The early institutional entrepreneurs had clear intentions to use the logics of 
banking in order to solve extant problems in the field of poverty alleviation. Yunus himself is quite 
explicit about his institution-building intentions to aid the poor:  
So we go step by step, concept by concept and institution by institution. We picked one 
institution that is banking. There may be something wrong there that we can fix. So we 
created another kind of banking — banking which doesn’t depend on collateral. (Bajaj, 
2006). 
 
This new hybrid logic was effective in renewing hope in the poverty alleviation field as it 
promised to solve the extant problems in the field. The problematic track record of NGOs engaging 
in comprehensive aid in the IRD/BHD-era would be overcome by a minimalist ‘hands off’ 
approach where NGOs could do the lending and avoid becoming bogged down in far-reaching 
endeavors well beyond their resources and competencies (Bhatt & Tang, 2001). The role for social 
enterprises as lenders to the poor would enable NGOs to retain their central position in the field of 
poverty alleviation and keep at bay the state agencies and inter-governmental institutions whom 




themselves fit equally well with the populist values of activists looking to avoid imposing ‘top-
down’ solutions (Dichter, 1999; Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Khavul, 2010) and the rising trend of 
neoliberal economic theories (Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Rogaly, 1996; Chowdhury, 2009). 
Dual compatibilities of the last type were apparent in many aspects of microfinance: an increase in 
outreach lowered transactions costs while making access to financial services more inclusive 
(Epstein & Yuthas, 2010; Hishigsuren, 2006); high repayment rates meant recovering lending costs 
and were taken as a sign of growing wealth among borrowers (Economist, 2009; Khavul, 2010); 
recovering costs allowed organizations to survive, thus making microfinance ‘sustainable’ and 
therefore able to impact poverty in the long-term (Khawari, 2004); and evidence showing females 
had higher repayment rates than males (Khawari, 2004; Morduch, 1999) meant economic 
development, good banking, and women’s empowerment could be simultaneously realized through 
the act of poverty lending. In other words, a single type of institutional practice was explained and 
legitimated by two different logics. Thus, the logics of poverty alleviation and banking did not only 
co-exist, they reinforced each other (Greenwood et al., 2010). 
In drawing on other available logics, it is apparent that actors involved in institutional 
entrepreneurship and institutional work and are embedded in multiple logics do not need to – nor 
should be motivated to – solve issues in one field by wholesale importation of external logics. 
Rather, these actors would do better to draw on only the elements, cognitive or normative, suited 
to advancing their particular goals. In adopting the logic of banking, the founders of microfinance 
were careful to incorporate only elements suited to their mission rather than the ‘complete set’ of 
available elements. Particularly, Yunus and his colleagues wanted to harness the highly legitimate 
methods of banking – backed by the framework of economic theory – to work towards the goal of 




tarnished means supported by the development logic of poverty alleviation. While the economic-
based logics of banking and entrepreneurship were used to theorize that access to capital would 
lead to value-generating activities among the poor (Yunus, 2007), economic prescriptions about 
letting the market decide interest rates were resisted because charging high interest rates and 
making extensive profit off the poor conflicted with the values of poverty alleviation practitioners 
(Ayayi & Sene, 2010; Yunus, 2011).  
 
Stage 2: Legitimating accounts of microfinance and the use of financial metrics to infer 
social performance 
 Once accounts resting on ‘borrowed’ logics are successfully introduced and become 
known locally, they can then be utilized and further articulated by other actors in the field pursuing 
their own agendas – i.e., taking advantage of affordances (van Dijk et al. 2011). If one financial 
indicator or framework is established as a measure for social development among poverty 
alleviation practitioners, it becomes less unusual that other elements of finance might be used to 
infer development as well (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010). We contend that if such acts of 
borrowing and re-use are successfully repeated within a field, then over time local accounts of 
behavior will have potentially more and more of their legitimacy derived from that alternate logic. 
That is, it can become the norm more widely to think about or rationalize development practices 
by using financial explanations. 
In the early years, the excitement hybrid development-banking logic was sufficient in 
providing legitimacy to practitioners in the field of microfinance. In the following years few 
rigorous evaluation systems were put in place to measure direct impact on clients or their 
communities (Chowdhury, 2009; Duvendack et al., 2011). The lack of measurement efforts can 




of developing countries (Copestake, 2007; Khavul, 2010). However, there has also been a lack of 
motivation among practitioners and donors (Bajaj, 2011), many of whom consider spending 
resources on evaluation a ‘waste of time’ (Morduch, 1999). Practitioners have often taken 
microfinance on faith, and Yunus claims retrospectively that strong rhetoric and “overbilling” were 
necessary to mobilize donor support (Bunting, 2011). Donors for their part generally desire that 
their funds to be used for programmatic activities rather than research that may cast doubt on the 
efficacy of the programs they support (Mordoch, 1999). In its guidelines for donors, the umbrella 
organization CGAP (CGAP, 2006) recommends that donors track key performance indicators with 
no mention of direct social impact: “general outreach, outreach to the poor, portfolio quality, 
profitability/sustainability, efficiency” and to otherwise “avoid burdening financial institutions 
with too many indicators”. In fact, only in the last three years have randomized controlled trials, 
which can show whether microfinance is making a social impact, have been conducted (El-Zoghbi 
& Martinez, 2011).  
To be sure, actors may engage in post-hoc theorizing to conciliate newly adopted activities 
with their dominant logic (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008), but unless there 
are specific legitimacy challenges, these practices can remain under-theorized from the perspective 
of the this logic. In the case of microfinance, practitioners may see no reason to engage in 
potentially contentious attempts to prove their banking methods work under direct measures of 
development if no one is questioning them, as such attempts may take their already accepted 
practices from the realm of ‘confidence and good faith’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) into one of 
conscious debate. 
To manage the legitimacy of microfinance from a development logic perspective, 
practitioners have a history of utilizing case studies – compelling stories of individual clients 




al., 2011) and Mohammad Yunus’s famously repeated claim that “5% of Grameen borrowers 
escape poverty every year” (Bajaj, 2006). In an examination of microfinance, Epstein and Yuthas 
(2010: 212) note that while several rating systems had been developed to measure social outcomes, 
existing systems are “heavily weighted toward financial performance and either ignore the social 
impact of the [microfinance institution] or provide only superficial indicators of effectiveness in 
this area”. Similarly, Copestake (2007: 1722) suggests social performance assessment and 
management in the field of microfinance “have failed to achieve the same clarity, consistency, and 
level of acceptance as financial performance assessment and management”. 
While these development practices may remain supported by financial explanations for 
some time, they will still be vulnerable to institutional challenges from actors not acquainted with 
– or swayed by – banking logics (i.e. conditions 1 and 2 above are not met). Such criticism may 
become an issue when previously peripheral actors gain power in the field (van Gestel & 
Hillebrand, 2011), or when powerful external actors ascribing to different logics take notice of the 
local field (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). While local actors may respond to these challenges by 
post-hoc theorizing, they may fail to generate compelling accounts of the legitimacy of their 
behavior, for example when long-term documentation (or lack thereof) makes it difficult for actors 
to control interpretation of their actions. We illustrate these challenges in stage three. 
Stage 3: Challenges to microfinance’s efficacy as a tool for development and the shift to 
commercialization 
The heightened visibility of the microfinance field coupled with the perceived lack of 
evidence on its progress towards social goals had made the field ripe for criticism. Since the 1990’s 
skeptics in media, government, and academia have mounted attacks on a number of fronts claiming 




Economist, 2009; Bateman, 2011; Duvendack et al., 2011), does not spur the creation of legitimate 
entrepreneurial ventures (Ditcher, 1999; Karnani, 2007), is not sustainable (Bhatt & Tang, 2001; 
Kashyap, 2010), does not enhance women’s status (Duvendack et al., 2011; IRIN Global, 2012), 
and is engaged in aggressive lending to uninformed clients (Epstein & Smith, 2007; Gokhale, 2009; 
Kashyap, 2010). Even extraordinarily high repayment rates, the centerpiece of the assertion that 
microfinance is both sustainable and generating value for its clients, is questioned not only on 
grounds of inflated figures (Battilana & Dorado, 2010) but on grounds that they create spirals of 
debt among borrowers who resort to taking loans from multiple banks, (Khavul, 2010; Simanowitz, 
2011) or face social exclusion and intimidation when they run into financial difficulties 
(Simanowitz, 2011; Tharoor, 2011). Stories of clients in rural parts of India committing suicide by 
the scores have hit the news, further damaging good will towards the microfinance field, and 
leading to government intervention forgiving clients of their debts and restricting microlending 
activities (Sinha, 2011; Tharoor, 2011). 
The logic of poverty alleviation as a basis for microfinance is experiencing challenges to 
its legitimacy. However, the loss of legitimacy does not entail the collapse of microfinance as an 
activity but rather shifts the underlying basis given for its existence and perhaps a reconfiguration 
of certain practices (e.g. see Thornton & Ocasio, 1999 and Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006 for 
fields shifting bases of legitimacy). The legitimacy vacuum can therefore continue to be filled by 
alternative logics by actors interested in maintaining their social practices (Dacin & Dacin, 2008). 
With no local counterweight to these logics however, local institutional entrepreneurs will have 
difficulty maintaining the course of their original goals and their own centrality in the field. 
Standing in contrast with the lack of serious assessment of microfinance’s social impact is 
the availability of rigorous evaluation systems and the consensus surrounding the banking side of 




used as proxies in place of direct measures of social impact that have sometimes become ends of 
themselves (Rhyne, 2010) as the banking logic has become more influential.  
This is an important point as the indictors have been taken up by industry observers, and 
because prior research has shown that ranking systems have a powerful effect not only on 
conferring legitimacy, but on shaping the categories by which organizational members evaluate 
themselves (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). In this respect, the Microfinance Information Exchange, 
Inc (MIX) founded by CGAP and other important actors in the microfinance industry 
(www.themix.org) is one of the major organizations that collects data and disseminates information 
on microfinance institutions and has been relied on by a number of academics in the fields such as 
management, economics, and development (e.g. Ayayi & Sene, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011; Hoque, 
Chishty, & Halloway, 2011) in conducting peer-reviewed research. MIX, like nearly all the rating 
systems in the field, relies solely on financial indicators such as scale, efficiency, risk, and returns 
in its highly visible ranking of microfinance institutions (Epstein & Yuthas, 2010). Sustainability 
continues to be an essential achievement for legitimacy in the field, with CGAP declaring that 
“Microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to reach very large numbers of poor people” 
(CGAP, 2006).   
While the rhetoric of the development logic stands, the norms for behavior in microfinance 
have become less distinguishable from mainstream commercial banking. CGAP announces that 
“microfinance will only realize its potential if it is integrated into a country mainstream financial 
system” (CGAP, 2004). The apex organization has also abandoned the wariness of early 
microfinance practitioners to lend interest at free market rates, noting in its 2006 ‘good practice 
guidelines’ the key principle that “Interest rate ceilings prevent microfinance institutions from 




Given the penetration of banking logics in the field of microfinance, commercial banks 
have been able to use them to legitimate practices that may have been unacceptable in the field’s 
early years. One such organization is Compartamos Banco, which was founded as a non-profit 
organization in 1990, and underwent transformation in 2006 to become the largest microfinance 
bank in Latin America (Rosenberg, 2007). When attacks on its choice to commercialize and 
undertake an IPO emerged from poverty alleviation practitioners, Compartamos Banco responded 
with a “letter to our peers”, defending the legitimacy of its actions (Danel & Labarthe, 2008). In 
the response, co-founders Carlos Danel and Carlos Labarthe repeatedly draw on banking-based 
logics to justify how increased commercialization ultimately helps alleviate poverty more 
effectively than developmental approaches. The following quotes illustrate how commercial 
microfinance is justified by aligning it with mainstream finance, by arguing that “mainstream” 
investors benefits the poor more than socially motivated investors due to sustainability, and a 
justification that organizations working within commercial markets are more accountable than non-
profits, respectively: 
Good microfinance institutions are good financial institutions: those who can 
understand the needs of their clients and provide products that add value to them 
and reduce risk in the process...microfinance has to be treated as finance, because 
it is no different from it. (Danel & Labarthe, 2008: 3) 
…we were very much committed to prove that microfinance was investment worthy 
within the mainstream financial sector. Filling our balance sheet with socially 
motivated investors was attractive, but it crowded out mainstream investors in the 
long run...we are convinced about average profits are necessary to draw in  investors 
and competition. (7) 
A public company such as Compartamos has to be ultra-transparent (not only by 
choice but by regulation) and is held accountable by many (the industry, markets, 





With such statements, the authors mobilize the legitimacy accorded to the banking logic to 
not only resolve its contradictions with the development logic, but effectively argue that resolving 
the contradictions in favor of the banking logics is in fact the most legitimate way of accomplishing 
the goals constructed by the development logic. Furthermore, the statement of Compartamos, to 
put a play on words, replaces the vision of ‘doing well by doing good’ with a rationale of ‘doing 
good by doing well’. The profitability of Compartamos is to be taken as a sign that the bank’s 
behaviors are furthering the goals that the poverty alleviation practitioners espouse: 
But one thing needs to be pointed out: the only reason Compartamos has been able 
to create economic value, is because of the social value created by this financial and 
working methodology. (9) 
 
The actions of Compartamos Banco in commercializing are defended by some of the major 
microfinance umbrella organizations. The Chairman of ACCION International, of which 
Comparatamos is a member, calls the IPO a “big win” that is needed to attract more capital into 
the industry (Economist, 2008). A CGAP issued report by senior advisor Richard Rosenberg 
(2007:1) states that the bank’s 2007 IPO was a “spectacular success” for attracting “truly 
commercial investors, [and] not socially responsible investors”. The report goes on to promote the 
merging of microfinance with commercial markets, predicting that “the transaction will probably 
give a significant boost to the credibility of microfinance in commercial capital markets, and 
accelerate the mobilization of private capital for the business of providing financial serves to poor 
and low-income people” (1). 
We believe that the norm-setting capacities of umbrella organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) such as CGAP and institutions that rank organizations in the field and confer legitimacy 




banks in microfinance represent a success in the legitimization of poverty lending, yet in a form 
that is increasingly legitimized by banking logics, rather than their selective application to 
development issues. In the following section, we construct an analytical dimension of institutional 
logics focused upon permeability and openness to change to account for the long-term instability 
in the “banking-development” hybrid logic. 
 
The Permeability of Institutional Logics 
The characterization of institutional logics in the preceding section as a set of elements follows 
from research focusing on how actors navigate institutional environments when seeking status and 
legitimacy.  In this case, our desire is to show how isolated bits of commercial banking logic are 
followed by the rest of the logic into the microfinance field, in large part without explicit attempts 
at institutional change in favor of increasing banking dominance. From the macro-perspective the 
effect is the creation of a hybrid logic composed of development and banking logics in equal parts, 
followed by the increasing influence of the latter at the cost of the former. This is in line with much 
of the macro-level research conceptualizing logics as having relatively stable boundaries – that is, 
a view that a handful of logics and their relative influence can be identified and represented by 
researchers examining an institutional field (see Battilana & Dorado, 2010 and Khavul et al., 2011 
for a breakdown of the logics constituting microfinance).  
Evidence from research suggests that upon entry into a contested field, institutional logics may 
blend but do not immediately dissolve into a sea of their constitutive elements as actors try to pull 
them apart in pursuing their individual goals (DiMaggio, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2011). Part of 
this consistency can be ascribed to regulatory mechanisms, such as efforts by professions to 
maintain standards (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Yet in the field of microfinance, we find that 




banking logic into their field. Despite these early desires, as we have argued, the banking logic 
over time was articulated within the microfinance field more wholly, and in a form more consistent 
with its presence in mainstream commercial banking. This is especially surprising given the field 
of microfinance was in its early days dominated by poverty alleviation practitioners who would 
have been more comfortable with a development logic over a banking logic; those individuals 
described by Banco Solidario’s founder in Battilana and Dorado (2010: 1425) as “social workers, 
teachers, sociologists, graduates from the school of life, ex-nuns and priests, Trotskyites and 
theologians.”  
We find in the contrast between the development and banking logics in the context of 
microfinance, an opportunity to conciliate the affording view of institutional logics as being 
composed of a set of contested elements with room for creative maneuver (van Dijk et al., 2011), 
and the view of institutional logics as having some unity which makes them relatively coherent and 
distinguishable at the macro-level (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In order to do so, we suggest that 
the elements, whether symbolic or material, constituting institutional logics can be seen as a 
nomological network or a system of signification (see Suddaby, 2010) by which the meaning of a 
particular institutional norm, concept, or practice only makes sense relative to a larger system 
(Searle, 1995). Such a view implies that the nature of a logic is not only dependent on the aggregate 
of substantive elements it contains, but the structure of interrelations among them. Keeping this in 
mind, we define permeability as the extent to which an institutional logic’s composition consists 
of ambiguity in, and loose coupling amongst its elements. As will be explained below, the more 
permeable a logic is, the more it is amenable to re-interpretation, ‘editing’ (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008), 
and creative maneuver (van Dijk et al., 2011) because its elements may be more easily detached or 
re-interpreted by actors to adapt the logic to legitimate themselves or their practices. We also 




will be transformed by other logics in a hybrid institutional field. This follows from the observation 
above that actors can re-interpret and elaborate institutional logics using any cultural material 
available to them, such as other logics. As such, the more open an institutional logic is open to re-
interpretation, the more freedom actors have un inserting elements from alternative logics into it in 
order to solve problems, ‘fill in the gaps,’ or pursue political goals. We elaborate on the two aspects 
that determine the permeability of a logic below, ambiguity and coupling among elements, and 
explain the relevance of these characteristics for microfinance. 
 Van Dijk et al. (2011) highlight the first important characteristic of institutional logics upon 
which permeability may vary, ambiguity, which “... arises where different interpretations conflict 
or where meanings of institutional interests, norms and beliefs are vague or inconsistent”. They go 
on to show, within an organizational context, how actors ‘transform’ the local logic to fit 
understandings of legitimate behavior around their own initiatives within the firm. Thus, 
ambiguous elements are more malleable to the political behavior of actors during reproduction in 
a way that more specific elements are not. The level of ambiguity of an element (whether a concept, 
norm, or practice) may vary to the extent it relies on sharp distinctions, and the extent to which it 
can be quantified and codified. 
In considering the banking logic within the context of microfinance, we see little ambiguity in 
its categories of evaluation. While broadly defined visions of corporate identity were transformed 
by actors in van Dijk et al. (2011), it is more difficult to imagine how the logic of banking, with 
quantitative measures of evaluation such as portfolio size and return on assets could be easily re-
interpreted by proponents of a project generating a loss. At best, some minor modifications can be 
made with concepts such as portfolio at risk where the proportion of outstanding loans can be 
defined variously as 30, 60, or 90 days (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). Even so, such decisions 




Institutional logics with more quantifiable measures and metrics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) may 
thus require actors to have more resources in the field as they must make their changes with greater 
transparency, and will have less affordances given to them. Furthermore, sharp categories and lack 
of tacit elements of a logic may protect unintentional transformation. Zucker (1988) proposed that 
institutions are susceptible to erosion over time through “imperfect transmission” due to a number 
of factors such as political pressures and personal characteristics of actors occupying roles. 
Following this argument, the banking logics could be taken into the microfinance field relatively 
intact due to its clear categories and reliance on equations for theory contained in codified form 
(for example, textbooks). In contrast, the development logic tends to be defined by ambiguous 
statements of poverty alleviation. To that end, a history of poverty alleviation in the 20th century 
illuminates the great variance in the criteria of legitimate participants, techniques, and even the 
definition of poverty (Ditcher, 1999).  
The second characteristic of an institutional logic shaping its permeability is the extent to 
which the elements of a logic are tightly versus loosely coupled.  More permeable logics are 
composed of elements which are not strongly bound together through reference or signification 
(Suddaby, 2010). For instance, certain means will not be strongly tied to ends. Different values will 
inform specific areas of practice but not always reference each other, and the elements of a set will 
be together through happenstance rather than logical order. Impermeable logics by contrast will 
have strong interconnections between their elements; means and ends will be tightly coupled with 
each other. Consequently, when a portion of its elements diffuse to a field, there will be a pressure 
to adopt the rest of the ‘set’. This can occur passively without any political intention, as when actors 
who have taken-for-granted only some elements of the logic will likely rediscover other elements 
of the set during acts of theorizing or will find the explanations offered by the rest of the logic, 




actively, such as when an actor importing an element to legitimate their actions will continue to 
articulate their account with more elements of the set. 
The coherence of the banking logic comes from the structure provided by rational choice 
theory (RCT). Acceptance of the theory as a true or useful description of human behavior, and the 
early successes of its application create a force for its expansion. Measures are tightly interwoven 
and may have a hierarchical (Pfeffer, 1993; Searle, 1995), or ‘cumulative’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) order. To measure portfolio at risk requires measurement of gross loan portfolio and through 
that other financial indicators. The hierarchical nature of financial indicators as part of the banking 
logic thus encourage collection of multiple forms of data to create these higher-level metrics, and 
in doing so, provide microfinance organizations with many lower-level financial indicators that 
guide lending policies.  
In addition to increased refinement of measures, a second mechanism through which banking 
logics expand is through generalization of scope. If lending models such as group lending 
(Armendariz & Morduch, 2010) applying RCT encourage clients to repay, then it follows that 
governance structures in line with RCT will encourage microfinance staff to perform as intended 
by top management and donors. Theories of intrinsic motivation of staff become as unbelievable 
as beliefs that clients would repay out of their own good will if lending technologies were not in 
place. Such a multi-wave model of diffusion is illustrated by Shipilov et al. (2010), who in a study 
of Canadian public corporations, proposed that adoption of board practices backed by agency 
theory committed organizations to defining the problem by the logic of agency theory, and thus 
made them more likely to adopt further practices along those lines. Agency theory, deriving from 
the rational choice model, has become increasingly important for both practitioners of microfinance 
and the research that guides them (Mersland, 2010). In particular, donors have requested that 




(Epstein & Yuthas, 2010) which work along agency theory lines. The shift to RCT within the field 
of microfinance is illustrated by the following CGAP report claiming that:  
 “It is increasingly recognized that, to be effective, financial services for the poor must be 
market driven and thus respond to client needs” (CGAP, 2006). 
 
The banking logic present in the microfinance field represents a case from the impermeable 
side of the field. This logic is strongly, deliberately theorized and rests on economic theory. Such 
theory has low ambiguity and tight coupling among elements. Elements of the logic follow – and 
can be reconstructed – from a relatively narrow set elements, such as RCT and marginal decision 
making.  Furthermore, positive claims (free markets generate the most wealth for society) are 
strongly attached to, and imply, norms (free markets are good for society).   
Pfeffer (1993) makes a similar distinction in contrasting social scientific fields, arguing that 
those marked by more unified paradigm benefit from consensus regarding basic assumptions, 
outcome evaluation, consistency in research methods, and frameworks which are easy to absorb as 
a cohesive argument and recall. According to Pfeffer (1993), this consensus provides the field with 
a higher degree of cumulative development of theory, as well as influence over other fields. Those 
disciplines lacking a core of consensus he argues, are less influential and littered with ideas from 
adjacent fields wherever they have come in handy. Placing these arguments in the context of 
microfinance, we find that the development logic contains a myriad of understandings about 
poverty alleviation – from post-war development assistance (Dichter, 1999) to BHN/IRD to 
microfinance and more recently, Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) approaches (Prahalad & Hammond, 
2002), and resembles more a bundle of inherited ideas, many of which can be dropped without 
creating discontinuity in the field (Zammuto, 1984), rather than a systemic line of thought. 
During hybridization of two or more logics then, we would expect then a logic characterized 




logic, like the economically-backed banking logic. Elements of permeable logics failing to provide 
legitimate accounts to the field or any actor within it can be more easily re-interpreted or discarded 
without threatening other, more useful or taken-for-granted, elements of the set. We therefore 
foresee that in contested spaces, logics with ambiguous or loosely coupled elements will be 
particularly malleable in suiting actor’s needs and gradually lose their meaning. In the case of 
institutions where actors are drawn from multiple fields, these logics may not so much be adopted 
or discarded wholesale, but become diluted by elements of other logics. By contrast, impermeable 
logics with their systemic reasoning will be less amenable to the entrance of external elements, as 
an assault on the legitimacy of any element threatens (many) other elements as well (Bunge, 2000). 
Actors will therefore have less room to use external accounts to legitimate their behaviors unless 
they attempt to re-theorize their entire field, or do not realize such re-theorization by others may 
be an unintended consequence of minute acts of borrowing. The contrast between permeable and 
impermeable institutional logics is summarized in Table 1.  
The upper section of the table outlines the two categories along which we determine the 
permeability of an institutional logic: the extent of ambiguity and loose coupling of its elements. 
Ambiguity arises from features such as vague, inconsistent, or tacit rules and conceptual schemes; 
loose coupling elements such as rules and concepts that do not logically necessitate the existence 
or specific interpretation of other elements within the logic. The lower section of the table 
summarizes the proposed significance of the permeability concept. Namely, relatively permeable 
logics can be more easily hybridized or edited by institutional entrepreneurs and those seeking 
legitimate accounts of their activity. On account of these possibilities, we further expect 
institutional logics that are permeable will be more often found in various mutations across fields, 
rather than existing in a more consistent form. For this reason, we also expect more difficulty in 





Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                  ------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
Our objective in this paper was to examine the evolution of microfinance and in particular 
to understand why the poverty alleviation practitioners who established the field found themselves 
and their principles displaced by the same commercial forces who had previously little interest in 
this market. To this end, we argued that selective application and borrowing of financial principles 
underlying a banking logic were utilized by poverty alleviation practitioners to infuse their field 
with legitimacy. Over time, the banking logic increasingly dominated as the vocabulary of 
legitimacy the field, and the lack of theorization of the development logic subsequently left it open 
for criticism, leading actors in the microfinance field to take new loans from the banking logic to 
sustain their legitimacy. We propose that this process occurred largely unintentionally, out of the 
aggregate of attempts among microfinance practitioners to demonstrate their efficacy in alleviating 
poverty by appealing to financial indicators. Furthermore, we introduced the concept of 
permeability – the extent to which the elements of an institutional logic are ambiguous and loosely 
coupled – to explain why some logics may be more malleable and open to the influence of other 
logics than others. We believe this examination and interpretation provides contributions for both 
theory and for practice. 
 
Contributions to Institutional Theory 
The literature on institutional logics is an emerging area of inquiry within the broader 
domain of institutional theory. Our examination of the evolution of microfinance contributes to this 
area in two ways in  illustrating the impact that established logics can have when they are brought 




establishing a logic over a field, and even standard operating procedures, can create conditions 
which can be appropriated by third parties who act as rivals. Institutional entrepreneurs and 
organizations in borrowing logics from other fields risk ‘opening the gates’ to a set of organizations 
that are well adapted to operating under that logic. We thus contend accounts of institutional change 
stressing agency also need to pay attention to how that change may be appropriated by others whose 
response may be anything but static. 
Second, by introducing the notion of permeability, we argue that some hybridized fields are 
prone to instability due to their component logics. When there are differences in the specificity and 
coupling of elements between two logics, we suggest fields may naturally drift to one pole unless 
balancing mechanisms are in place. We elaborate on each of these contributions below and discuss 
how they relate to recent work in the institutional logics literature. 
Unintended Change: In exploring how individuals and organizations legitimate themselves 
under existing frameworks, researchers stress that actors creatively manage logics through 
discursive means in order to present their interests as comprehensible, correct, and appropriate 
(Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008 ; van Dijk et al., 2011). These discussions stand somewhat apart from 
research in areas such as institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and entrepreneurship 
(Hardy & Maguire, 2008) where actors seek to advance their interests by purposively changing 
their institutional environment. We offer as a contribution an insight into the long-term, 
unanticipated consequences at the field-level stemming from use of institutional affordances. We 
suggest that actors developing accounts to legitimate themselves under a given framework may be 
contributing to large scale institutional shifts without intending to do so or even being aware of it. 
Poverty alleviation practitioners working in microfinance were able to manage impressions in the 
short run by drawing on banking logics, but in the long-run they created an environment in which 




commercial banking were able to increase their influence and centrality in the field of microfinance 
through concentrated efforts to change the rules of the game, it seems much of the groundwork had 
been done for them through poverty alleviation practitioners’ accounts equating financial success 
with development goals. 
We do not suggest that such outcomes are inevitable however. In the context of 
microfinance, Battilana and Dorado (2010) show at the organizational level how managers may be 
able to maintain a balance between multiple logics by fostering a strong organizational identity. At 
the institutional level, control over collective identities and legitimation practices may be more 
difficult, but achievable either through professionalization, a stronger role for umbrella 
organizations committed to maintaining a balance of logics, or emerging norms between rival firms 
which define acceptable use of legitimation tactics (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 
1995).  
At the institutional level, some insights can be gained by comparing the trends identified in 
the field of microfinance to Murray’s (2010) study of multiple institutional logics between the 
boundaries of academic and commercial genetic research. Rejecting that overlapping institutional 
logics must inevitably result in the domination of one or that boundaries between fields sharing 
logics necessarily dissolve, Murray (2010: 346) argues that skilled actors can “take the resources 
of one logic, transform their meaning, and thus establish differentiating meanings”. In the case of 
genetic research, Murray (2010) shows how academic researchers were able to subvert the 
encroachment of commercial logics in their field by appropriating practices of the commercial 
logic, namely patenting laws, in order to safeguard the scientific commons. Two issues of interest 
here are the existing institutional resources available to social actors, and the extent that meanings 
of practices are predefined. First, Murray (2010) notes that powerful institutional resources, such 




which eventually became embodied within scientific institutions, thus limiting the influence of 
commercial logics in academic science. By contrast, the field of modern microfinance incorporated 
banking logics from its outset, which meant that there was little opportunity for poverty alleviation 
practitioners to construct institutions that would protect the boundaries of their field. When 
boundary-defining structures did arrive, such as CGAP, ACCION, and MIX market, they were 
heavily imprinted with a banking logic, and in many cases opposed or undermined the boundary 
work of poverty alleviation practitioners, such as their declarations that interest rate ceilings were 
illegitimate (CGAP, 2006) or by championing Comparatmos’s decision to reach out to 
‘mainstream’ investors. (Economist, 2008; Rosenberg, 2007). The porosity of the field of 
microfinance to commercial logics relative to academic science may be partially explained then, 
by their historical development. Research on the diffusion of logics across fields may thus benefit 
from paying greater attention to the origins of local institutions, and how imprinting effects may 
explain why they sometimes enable boundary work, and sometimes undermine it. 
Secondly, Murray (2010: 380) notes that the meaning of some practices, such as patenting 
laws were underdetermined, which allowed for their flexible manipulation by interested social 
actors. She contrasts this to other practices with more rigid meanings, such as “might be the case 
if universities were to replace tenure with corporate-style employment contracts”. In the context of 
microfinance we find that many practices were neither underdetermined nor rigidly determined, 
but instead were overdetermined. Practices such as lending to women or increasing outreach had 
two well-defined – but different – meanings within different institutional systems. This allowed 
social actors to engage in a practice to attain one set of goals, while espousing the legitimacy of 
their actions under alternative logics. Thus, poverty alleviation practitioners initially were able to 
lend to women and claim it was sound banking practice (Morduch, 1999), and later the proponents 




poverty in the long run (CGAP, 2006; Danel & Labarthe, 2008). Future researchers may wish to 
consider using comparative studies how factors of institutional resources and determinacy of 
practices are associated with varying abilities of institutional entrepreneurs to engage in 
containment of borrowed logics. 
In addition to issues of institutional resources and determinacy of meaning, we suggest one 
particularly fruitful avenue of research would be to examine how differential outcomes of 
legitimacy borrowing may arise from the bases of social capital within a field (Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999). Banking logics, for instance, grant status to individuals knowledgeable in the field of finance 
(Lounsbury, 2002), which in turn may be signaled through a career in commercial enterprise or 
business education. Such status-granting forms of social capital may be difficult for poverty 
alleviation practitioners to obtain, thus giving external actors an edge in the field once the 
borrowing has occurred. Had poverty alleviation practitioners borrowed logics from a field where 
the barriers to obtaining social capital were weaker, borrowed legitimacy may not have posed such 
a threat to their status in their own field. As suggested above, we believe that field-level 
comparative studies may be able to give insight to the questions raised here. 
On the structure of logics: Institutional theorists have modeled how field instability may 
arise from social structural variables (Greenwood et al., 2011). To antecedents of field instability 
we add another dimension: our second contribution is to highlight the role of the internal 
differences of institutional logics themselves. Specifically, we suggest differences in the form 
between the development and banking logics corresponded to the former logic’s gradual dilution 
and loss of influence in the field. In exploring these distinctions between logics,  we made the case 
that conceptualizing some logics as more permeable than others was a useful perspective. 
Permeable logics, we stated are marked by ambiguity in, and loose coupling among, their elements, 




by contrast have higher specificity in their elements, which are more tightly coupled as well. Such 
logics were associated with a high degree of coherence or cumulativeness amongst their 
components, reliance on explicit knowledge, and a higher degree of cultural-cognitive 
comprehensibility (Sine & David, 2010).  This puts institutional entrepreneurs promoting 
permeable logics in contested fields at a disadvantage, we argued, as permeable logics have little 
inertia, and are more likely to be ‘undone’ or hijacked by less permeable ones. Our explication of 
the permeability concept is provisionary and we hope future researchers will consider the 
antecedents and consequences of such a category in empirical work, and examine future 
dimensions by which logics may differ. One particularly interesting question is how the historical 
development of a logic may account for a characteristic such as permeability. Modern economic 
theory was primarily developed by academics hoping to achieve internal consistency and 
universalistic explanations (Scott, 2008), whereas the development logic grew out of practitioners 
like Muhammad Yunus improvising in local contexts. A field-level characteristic such as the level 
of fragmentation (Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1991) may be one set of contextual variables that 
researchers may wish to consider in developing historical accounts of institutional logics. That is, 
institutional logics emerging from fields with central, hierarchically structured authorities may 
have a different character to them than those emerging from fields where there are multiple, less 
stable sources of authority. 
 
Contributions to Poverty Alleviation and Entrepreneurship 
Despite the relative sidelining of poverty alleviation practitioners in the institutional 
structures of microfinance, the recent outcomes of their efforts should not be seen in a necessarily 
negative light. In a case that echoes the current context, Tracey et al. (2011) highlight how 




organizational forms that outlast the initial ventures they were modeled on. From such a standpoint, 
the initial proponents of microfinance, as a class of social actor, may no longer be in control of the 
direction of the field, but their work in legitimating microlending to alleviate poverty has made a 
lasting impact. It remains an open question whether an increasingly commercialized microfinance 
field in the future will work to alleviate poverty, or whether it will subvert those goals. In the 
meantime, our ideas points to some practices that may allow poverty alleviation practitioners to 
regain some lost control in setting the direction of the field 
In the context of microfinance, higher emphasis on developing metrics to evaluate social 
impact would be a vital step forward. Such measures must stand on their own, without needing to 
be legitimated by commercial banking practices. It may even be beneficial to development goals if 
poverty alleviation practitioners can distinguish where these metrics legitimate practices that are 
different from, or even contradict, standard banking evaluations. We believe there is a much 
smaller risk for mission drift if a microfinance organization has the capacity to show that choices 
between financial growth and poverty alleviation do in fact, exist. 
One concern is that microfinance organizations have thus far been unable to demonstrate 
the level of success using social metrics as with financial ones (Duvendack et al., 2011). It is 
conceivable that should these organizations introduce new and rigorous evaluation systems for 
social performance, and then fail to deliver on these metrics, they will have an even harder time 
maintaining their status as legitimate actors in the field (Morduch, 1999). At the same time, we see 
no evidence that poverty lending is inherently more suited to making profit than demonstrable 
social performance. Modern microfinance follows from decades of failed attempts by states to 
provide credit to the poor (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010), and itself took years to refine lending 




& Morduch, 2010). In other words, organizations often develop the capacities that allow them to 
demonstrate success by the metrics imposed on them (Saunder & Espeland, 2009). More 
concretely, when microfinance organizations measure and are judged according to their repayment 
rates, they become exceedingly effective at improving their repayment rates. The trouble is that the 
drive towards higher repayment rates creates problems such as spiraling debt among borrowers 
which eventually drew attention and challenged the notion of microfinance as a poverty alleviation 
tool. If social metrics are made to count as much as financial ones, we suggest microfinance 
organizations can eventually develop the capacities to succeed on them as well. To this end, poverty 
alleviation practitioners in the field of microfinance may find greater space to build these capacities 
with socially-oriented investors, rather than in the mainstream financial markets championed by 
institutions like ACCION (Economist, 2008). In addition to social performance metrics, our study 
suggests that if microfinance is to be sustainable, a significant portion of the entrepreneurial agenda 
must be devoted to the development of an entrepreneurial infrastructure that supports 
developmental goals. This infrastructure may include such things as training and education, 
coaching and consulting on venture management, social finance and the development of strong 
local umbrella organizations and rating agencies committed to poverty alleviation goals to monitor, 
support and anchor microfinance initiatives (Hulme & Mosley, 1996; Karnani, 2007; Chowdhury, 
2009); . Thus, the work of poverty alleviation practitioners in microfinance does not stop at 
developing workable organizational models, but continues in maintaining an institutional 
framework in which they can exist. More broadly, we see these factors as important to consider for 
all social entrepreneurs given the typically blurred boundaries between social and conventional 
entrepreneurship (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010). The ‘perfect fit’ between a venture’s social 
mission and commercial framework may seem well initially, but could eventually lead to social 




Finally, it is important to recognize microfinance is but one tool which emerged to stimulate 
enterprise development amongst the poor. Recent, experimental models of development such as 
microfranchising (Fairbourne, Gibson, & Gibb, 2008) and microconsignment (van Kirk, 2010) 
follow on basic philosophies of microfinance such as sustainability and the entrepreneurship 
among the poor while avoiding many of its pitfalls. On a broader level, the rise of microfinance 
may have as its greatest social impact in presenting these approaches as a legitimate alternative to 
traditional development models. 
FIGURE 1 










The Permeability of Institutional Logics 
        
    Permeable Logics Impermeable Logics 
 Nature Ambiguity High Low 
  Coupling among elements Loose/Divisible Tight/Cumulative 
 Outcomes Openness to hybridization High Low 
  Restrictions on editing Low High 
  Differentiation across fields High Low 
  Ease of identification Low High 
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